diff --git a/doc/api/cli.md b/doc/api/cli.md
index 09c9b5309ffa..0b379b4bd63f 100644
--- a/doc/api/cli.md
+++ b/doc/api/cli.md
@@ -268,6 +268,26 @@ process.permission.has('fs.read', 'custom-require.js'); // true
 process.permission.has('fs.read', 'custom-require-2.js'); // true
 ```
 
+### `--allow-fs-vfs`
+
+<!-- YAML
+added: REPLACEME
+-->
+
+> Stability: 1.1 - Active development
+
+When using the [Permission Model][], a [virtual file system][] cannot be
+mounted by default: [`vfs.mount()`][] throws `ERR_INVALID_STATE` unless the
+user explicitly passes the `--allow-fs-vfs` flag when starting Node.js.
+
+A mounted VFS serves paths that the file system permissions do not describe,
+so mounting one is gated on its own flag rather than on `--allow-fs-read` or
+`--allow-fs-write`.
+
+```console
+$ node --experimental-vfs --permission --allow-fs-vfs app.js
+```
+
 ### `--allow-fs-write`
 
 <!-- YAML
@@ -3878,6 +3898,7 @@ one is included in the list below.
 * `--allow-child-process`
 * `--allow-ffi`
 * `--allow-fs-read`
+* `--allow-fs-vfs`
 * `--allow-fs-write`
 * `--allow-inspector`
 * `--allow-net`
@@ -4589,6 +4610,7 @@ node --stack-trace-limit=12 -p -e "Error.stackTraceLimit" # prints 12
 [`v8.startupSnapshot.addDeserializeCallback()`]: v8.md#v8startupsnapshotadddeserializecallbackcallback-data
 [`v8.startupSnapshot.setDeserializeMainFunction()`]: v8.md#v8startupsnapshotsetdeserializemainfunctioncallback-data
 [`v8.startupSnapshot` API]: v8.md#startup-snapshot-api
+[`vfs.mount()`]: vfs.md#vfsmount
 [asynchronous module customization hooks]: module.md#asynchronous-customization-hooks
 [captured by the built-in snapshot of Node.js]: https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/b19525a33cc84033af4addd0f80acd4dc33ce0cf/test/parallel/test-bootstrap-modules.js#L24
 [collecting code coverage from tests]: test.md#collecting-code-coverage
@@ -4620,4 +4642,5 @@ node --stack-trace-limit=12 -p -e "Error.stackTraceLimit" # prints 12
 [test runner execution model]: test.md#test-runner-execution-model
 [timezone IDs]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones
 [tracking issue for user-land snapshots]: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/44014
+[virtual file system]: vfs.md
 [ways that `TZ` is handled in other environments]: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/TZ-Variable.html
diff --git a/doc/api/vfs.md b/doc/api/vfs.md
index 2070efdac238..ea1d392787f8 100644
--- a/doc/api/vfs.md
+++ b/doc/api/vfs.md
@@ -417,6 +417,12 @@ system, the callers are responsible for avoiding removal or
 invalidation of modules in the virtual file system while they are
 being loaded.
 
+Native addons (`.node` files) stored in a mounted VFS can be `require()`d as
+well. The operating system's dynamic loader cannot open a virtual path, so the
+addon's bytes are read from the VFS and loaded from a private, self-cleaning
+temporary image instead. Addons on the real file system are unaffected and
+load directly.
+
 ## Class: `VirtualProvider`
 
 <!-- YAML
diff --git a/doc/node.1 b/doc/node.1
index 72680aa892ab..a12cf01bb8a5 100644
--- a/doc/node.1
+++ b/doc/node.1
@@ -166,6 +166,17 @@ process.permission.has('fs.read', 'custom-require.js'); // true
 process.permission.has('fs.read', 'custom-require-2.js'); // true
 .Ed
 .
+.It Fl -allow-fs-vfs
+When using the Permission Model, a virtual file system cannot be
+mounted by default: \fBvfs.mount()\fR throws \fBERR_INVALID_STATE\fR unless the
+user explicitly passes the \fB--allow-fs-vfs\fR flag when starting Node.js.
+A mounted VFS serves paths that the file system permissions do not describe,
+so mounting one is gated on its own flag rather than on \fB--allow-fs-read\fR or
+\fB--allow-fs-write\fR.
+.Bd -literal
+$ node --experimental-vfs --permission --allow-fs-vfs app.js
+.Ed
+.
 .It Fl -allow-fs-write
 This flag configures file system write permissions using
 the Permission Model.
@@ -1944,6 +1955,8 @@ one is included in the list below.
 .It
 \fB--allow-fs-read\fR
 .It
+\fB--allow-fs-vfs\fR
+.It
 \fB--allow-fs-write\fR
 .It
 \fB--allow-inspector\fR
diff --git a/lib/internal/vfs/setup.js b/lib/internal/vfs/setup.js
index 979990d1a855..a45cd47a9bf4 100644
--- a/lib/internal/vfs/setup.js
+++ b/lib/internal/vfs/setup.js
@@ -914,6 +914,26 @@ function installModuleLoaderOverrides() {
   });
 }
 
+let originalDlopen;
+
+function installAddonLoader() {
+  originalDlopen = process.dlopen;
+  process.dlopen = function(module, filename, flags) {
+    // dlopen(2) cannot open a native addon that lives in a VFS by path (it has
+    // no real inode). Read its bytes and hand them to the internal
+    // dlopenBinary(), which writes them to a private, self-cleaning temporary
+    // image - an in-memory memfd on Linux - and loads that. Only VFS paths take
+    // this route; everything else loads straight from disk through the
+    // unchanged process.dlopen().
+    if (StringPrototypeStartsWith(filename, normalizedVfsRootPrefix)) {
+      const { readFileSync } = require('fs');
+      const { dlopenBinary } = internalBinding('process_methods');
+      return dlopenBinary(module, filename, flags, readFileSync(filename));
+    }
+    return originalDlopen(module, filename, flags);
+  };
+}
+
 /**
  * Install all VFS hooks: module loader overrides and fs handlers.
  */
@@ -922,6 +942,7 @@ function installHooks() {
   debug('install hooks');
   normalizedVfsRootPrefix = getNormalizedVfsRoot() + sep;
   installModuleLoaderOverrides();
+  installAddonLoader();
   vfsHandlerObj = createVfsHandlers();
   setVfsHandlers(vfsHandlerObj);
   hooksInstalled = true;
@@ -939,6 +960,7 @@ function uninstallHooks() {
   setLoaderOverrides();
   setVfsHandlers(null);
   vfsHandlerObj = undefined;
+  process.dlopen = originalDlopen;
   hooksInstalled = false;
 }
 
diff --git a/src/node_binding.cc b/src/node_binding.cc
index 26f8d046f6da..0437f59ca60e 100644
--- a/src/node_binding.cc
+++ b/src/node_binding.cc
@@ -9,6 +9,20 @@
 #include "util.h"
 
 #include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#include <windows.h>
+#else
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <cerrno>
+#include <cstdlib>
+#if defined(__linux__)
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#endif
+#endif
 
 #if HAVE_OPENSSL
 #define NODE_BUILTIN_OPENSSL_BINDINGS(V) V(crypto) V(tls_wrap)
@@ -438,13 +452,295 @@ inline node_api_addon_get_api_version_func GetNapiAddonGetApiVersionCallback(
       dlib->GetSymbolAddress(STRINGIFY(NODE_API_MODULE_GET_API_VERSION)));
 }
 
-// DLOpen is process.dlopen(module, filename, flags).
-// Used to load 'module.node' dynamically shared objects.
+namespace {
+
+#ifndef _WIN32
+// Write the whole buffer to `fd`, retrying partial writes and EINTR.
+bool WriteAllToFd(int fd, const char* data, size_t len) {
+  size_t off = 0;
+  while (off < len) {
+    ssize_t n = write(fd, data + off, len - off);
+    if (n < 0) {
+      if (errno == EINTR) continue;
+      return false;
+    }
+    off += static_cast<size_t>(n);
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+#if defined(__linux__)
+int NodeMemfdCreate(const char* name, unsigned int flags) {
+  return static_cast<int>(syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags));
+}
+#endif  // __linux__
+#endif  // !_WIN32
+
+// Materializes native-addon bytes into a form dlopen()/LoadLibrary() can load,
+// with the smallest, most private on-disk footprint each platform allows:
+//   Linux:        an anonymous in-memory memfd, loaded via /proc/self/fd/N -
+//                 the bytes never touch the filesystem.
+//   other POSIX:  a 0700 mkdtemp() directory plus an O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW file,
+//                 unlink()ed right after the load (the mapping keeps it alive).
+//   Windows:      a temp file opened FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE; its handle is
+//                 retained for the process lifetime so the file is removed
+//                 automatically once the process (and the loaded DLL) exit.
+// Used for an addon that lives somewhere dlopen() cannot open by path, such as
+// a virtual file system.
+class AddonImage {
+ public:
+  AddonImage() = default;
+  ~AddonImage();
+  AddonImage(const AddonImage&) = delete;
+  AddonImage& operator=(const AddonImage&) = delete;
+
+  // The directory a temporary image would be written to, with a trailing
+  // separator; empty when it cannot be determined. Names the resource for the
+  // file-system permission check.
+  static std::string TempDir();
+
+  // On success sets path() to a real, loadable path for `data`.
+  bool Materialize(const char* data, size_t len);
+  const std::string& path() const { return path_; }
+  const std::string& errmsg() const { return errmsg_; }
+
+  // Call exactly once, right after DLib::Open(); `opened` says whether the load
+  // succeeded. Releases the transient resources that are no longer needed (a
+  // successful load holds its own mapping): on POSIX closes the memfd or
+  // unlinks the temp file; on Windows retains the delete-on-close handle for
+  // the process lifetime when opened, or closes it (deleting the file) on
+  // failure.
+  void AfterOpen(bool opened);
+
+ private:
+  std::string path_;
+  std::string errmsg_;
+  bool consumed_ = false;
+#ifdef _WIN32
+  HANDLE handle_ = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+#else
+  bool MaterializeTempFile(const char* data, size_t len);
+  int fd_ = -1;
+  std::string temp_dir_;  // non-empty only for the temp-file (non-memfd) path
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+
+// Delete-on-close handles kept alive until process exit so their temp files
+// outlive the loaded DLLs and are removed once the process ends.
+Mutex g_retained_addon_handles_mutex;
+std::vector<HANDLE>* g_retained_addon_handles = nullptr;
+
+// static
+std::string AddonImage::TempDir() {
+  wchar_t dir[MAX_PATH + 1];
+  DWORD dir_len = GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH + 1, dir);
+  if (dir_len == 0 || dir_len > MAX_PATH) return std::string();
+  int size = WideCharToMultiByte(
+      CP_UTF8, 0, dir, dir_len, nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
+  if (size <= 0) return std::string();
+  std::string out(size, '\0');
+  WideCharToMultiByte(
+      CP_UTF8, 0, dir, dir_len, out.data(), size, nullptr, nullptr);
+  return out;
+}
+
+bool AddonImage::Materialize(const char* data, size_t len) {
+  wchar_t dir[MAX_PATH + 1];
+  DWORD dir_len = GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH + 1, dir);
+  if (dir_len == 0 || dir_len > MAX_PATH) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not locate the temporary directory";
+    return false;
+  }
+  wchar_t file[MAX_PATH + 1];
+  if (GetTempFileNameW(dir, L"nod", 0, file) == 0) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not create a temporary file name";
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Reopen the just-created file delete-on-close, sharing delete so the loader
+  // can map it while it is delete-pending; the file is removed when this handle
+  // and the loader's section are both released (i.e. at process exit).
+  handle_ = CreateFileW(file,
+                        GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
+                        FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
+                        nullptr,
+                        CREATE_ALWAYS,
+                        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY | FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE,
+                        nullptr);
+  if (handle_ == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not create a temporary file for the native addon";
+    return false;
+  }
+  size_t off = 0;
+  while (off < len) {
+    DWORD chunk =
+        len - off > MAXDWORD ? MAXDWORD : static_cast<DWORD>(len - off);
+    DWORD written = 0;
+    if (!WriteFile(handle_, data + off, chunk, &written, nullptr)) {
+      errmsg_ = "could not write the native addon to a temporary file";
+      CloseHandle(handle_);
+      handle_ = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+      return false;
+    }
+    off += written;
+  }
+  int utf8_len =
+      WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, file, -1, nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
+  if (utf8_len <= 0) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not encode the temporary file path";
+    CloseHandle(handle_);
+    handle_ = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+    return false;
+  }
+  path_.resize(utf8_len - 1);
+  WideCharToMultiByte(
+      CP_UTF8, 0, file, -1, path_.data(), utf8_len, nullptr, nullptr);
+  return true;
+}
+
+void AddonImage::AfterOpen(bool opened) {
+  consumed_ = true;
+  if (handle_ == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return;
+  if (!opened) {
+    CloseHandle(handle_);  // delete-on-close removes the file
+    handle_ = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+    return;
+  }
+  Mutex::ScopedLock lock(g_retained_addon_handles_mutex);
+  if (g_retained_addon_handles == nullptr) {
+    g_retained_addon_handles = new std::vector<HANDLE>();
+  }
+  g_retained_addon_handles->push_back(handle_);
+  handle_ = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+}
+
+AddonImage::~AddonImage() {
+  // Materialized but Open() was never reached (e.g. an exception in between):
+  // closing the delete-on-close handle removes the file.
+  if (!consumed_ && handle_ != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) CloseHandle(handle_);
+}
+
+#else  // !_WIN32
+
+bool AddonImage::Materialize(const char* data, size_t len) {
+#if defined(__linux__)
+  // Prefer an anonymous in-memory fd, loaded through /proc/self/fd: nothing
+  // reaches the filesystem, so there is no temp file to secure, unlink, or
+  // leak, and no noexec-mount problem. Request an executable memfd (MFD_EXEC,
+  // Linux 6.3+); retry without it on older kernels that reject the flag, then
+  // fall back to a temp file if memfd is unavailable entirely.
+#ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
+#define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
+#endif
+#ifndef MFD_EXEC
+#define MFD_EXEC 0x0010U
+#endif
+  fd_ = NodeMemfdCreate("node-addon", MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC);
+  if (fd_ == -1 && errno == EINVAL) {
+    fd_ = NodeMemfdCreate("node-addon", MFD_CLOEXEC);
+  }
+  if (fd_ != -1) {
+    if (!WriteAllToFd(fd_, data, len)) {
+      errmsg_ = "could not write the native addon to an in-memory file";
+      close(fd_);
+      fd_ = -1;
+      return false;
+    }
+    path_ = "/proc/self/fd/" + std::to_string(fd_);
+    return true;
+  }
+#endif  // __linux__
+  return MaterializeTempFile(data, len);
+}
+
+// static
+std::string AddonImage::TempDir() {
+  const char* env_tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
+  std::string tmpdir =
+      (env_tmp != nullptr && *env_tmp != '\0') ? env_tmp : "/tmp";
+  if (tmpdir.back() != '/') tmpdir.push_back('/');
+  return tmpdir;
+}
+
+bool AddonImage::MaterializeTempFile(const char* data, size_t len) {
+  // A private 0700 directory (mkdtemp) so no other user can pre-create the path
+  // as a symlink or swap the file between the write and the load; O_EXCL and
+  // O_NOFOLLOW harden the create against a race inside it.
+  std::string tmpl = TempDir() + "node-addon-XXXXXX";
+  std::vector<char> buf(tmpl.begin(), tmpl.end());
+  buf.push_back('\0');
+  if (mkdtemp(buf.data()) == nullptr) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not create a temporary directory for the native addon";
+    return false;
+  }
+  temp_dir_ = buf.data();
+  std::string file = temp_dir_ + "/addon.node";
+  fd_ = open(
+      file.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
+  if (fd_ == -1) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not create a temporary file for the native addon";
+    rmdir(temp_dir_.c_str());
+    temp_dir_.clear();
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!WriteAllToFd(fd_, data, len)) {
+    errmsg_ = "could not write the native addon to a temporary file";
+    close(fd_);
+    fd_ = -1;
+    unlink(file.c_str());
+    rmdir(temp_dir_.c_str());
+    temp_dir_.clear();
+    return false;
+  }
+  // dlopen() reopens by path; the post-open mapping keeps the inode alive.
+  close(fd_);
+  fd_ = -1;
+  path_ = file;
+  return true;
+}
+
+void AddonImage::AfterOpen(bool opened) {
+  consumed_ = true;
+  // The right cleanup is the same whether or not the load worked.
+  (void)opened;
+  // memfd: the load's mapping (or nothing, on failure) owns it from here.
+  if (fd_ != -1) {
+    close(fd_);
+    fd_ = -1;
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!temp_dir_.empty()) {
+    // On success the mapping keeps the inode alive, so unlinking now leaves no
+    // on-disk trace; on failure this just cleans up.
+    unlink(path_.c_str());
+    rmdir(temp_dir_.c_str());
+    temp_dir_.clear();
+  }
+}
+
+AddonImage::~AddonImage() {
+  if (consumed_) return;
+  if (fd_ != -1) close(fd_);
+  if (!temp_dir_.empty()) {
+    unlink(path_.c_str());
+    rmdir(temp_dir_.c_str());
+  }
+}
+
+#endif  // _WIN32
+
+}  // namespace
+
+// Shared by process.dlopen() and the internal dlopenBinary(). `allow_binary`
+// says whether args[3] may carry the addon's bytes; it is false for
+// process.dlopen(), whose signature stays (module, filename[, flags]).
 //
 // FIXME(bnoordhuis) Not multi-context ready. TBD how to resolve the conflict
 // when two contexts try to load the same shared object. Maybe have a shadow
 // cache that's a plain C list or hash table that's shared across contexts?
-void DLOpen(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
+static void DLOpenImpl(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args,
+                       bool allow_binary) {
   Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);
 
   if (env->no_native_addons()) {
@@ -464,7 +760,11 @@ void DLOpen(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
   }
 
   int32_t flags = DLib::kDefaultFlags;
-  if (args.Length() > 2 && !args[2]->Int32Value(context).To(&flags)) {
+  // On the internal path an undefined flags argument keeps the default, so a
+  // caller can pass the bytes without choosing flags. process.dlopen() keeps
+  // its original behaviour of rejecting any non-integer that is present.
+  if (args.Length() > 2 && !(allow_binary && args[2]->IsUndefined()) &&
+      !args[2]->Int32Value(context).To(&flags)) {
     return THROW_ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE(env, "flag argument must be an integer.");
   }
 
@@ -477,12 +777,44 @@ void DLOpen(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
     return;  // Exception pending.
   }
 
-  node::Utf8Value filename(env->isolate(), args[1]);  // Cast
-  env->TryLoadAddon(*filename, flags, [&](DLib* dlib) {
+  node::Utf8Value filename(env->isolate(), args[1]);  // The addon's path,
+                                                      // used for diagnostics.
+
+  // On the internal path args[3] carries the addon's bytes, for an addon that
+  // lives somewhere dlopen() cannot open by path (e.g. a virtual file system).
+  // Materialize them into a private, self-cleaning image and load that, while
+  // still reporting `filename` in any error.
+  AddonImage image;
+  const char* load_path = *filename;
+  if (allow_binary && args.Length() > 3 && !args[3]->IsUndefined()) {
+    if (!args[3]->IsArrayBufferView()) {
+      return THROW_ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE(
+          env, "binary must be a Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView");
+    }
+    // Loading from bytes materializes them into an image in the temporary
+    // directory, so this needs write access there on top of the addon
+    // permission checked above. The check does not depend on whether the image
+    // actually reaches the file system on this platform (Linux uses an
+    // anonymous memfd): what a program must be granted should not vary by
+    // platform.
+    THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS(
+        env,
+        permission::PermissionScope::kFileSystemWrite,
+        AddonImage::TempDir());
+    ArrayBufferViewContents<char> binary(args[3]);
+    if (!image.Materialize(binary.data(), binary.length())) {
+      return THROW_ERR_DLOPEN_FAILED(
+          env, "%s: %s", image.errmsg().c_str(), *filename);
+    }
+    load_path = image.path().c_str();
+  }
+
+  env->TryLoadAddon(load_path, flags, [&](DLib* dlib) {
     static Mutex dlib_load_mutex;
     Mutex::ScopedLock lock(dlib_load_mutex);
 
     const bool is_opened = dlib->Open();
+    image.AfterOpen(is_opened);
 
     // Objects containing v14 or later modules will have registered themselves
     // on the pending list.  Activate all of them now.  At present, only one
@@ -582,6 +914,20 @@ void DLOpen(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
   // coverity[leaked_storage]
 }
 
+// process.dlopen(module, filename[, flags]). Used to load 'module.node'
+// dynamically shared objects.
+void DLOpen(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
+  DLOpenImpl(args, false);
+}
+
+// Internal only, reached through the process_methods binding rather than the
+// process object: dlopenBinary(module, filename, flags, binary) loads an addon
+// from bytes already in memory. Used for addons served by a virtual file
+// system, which the dynamic loader cannot open by path.
+void DLOpenBinary(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
+  DLOpenImpl(args, true);
+}
+
 inline struct node_module* FindModule(struct node_module* list,
                                       const char* name,
                                       int flag) {
diff --git a/src/node_binding.h b/src/node_binding.h
index b05c68ad0726..c200cc0d0c8a 100644
--- a/src/node_binding.h
+++ b/src/node_binding.h
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ void CreateInternalBindingTemplates(IsolateData* isolate_data);
 void GetInternalBinding(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args);
 void GetLinkedBinding(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args);
 void DLOpen(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args);
+void DLOpenBinary(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args);
 
 }  // namespace binding
 
diff --git a/src/node_options.cc b/src/node_options.cc
index 78309d1ae5cd..b62b635c1ff8 100644
--- a/src/node_options.cc
+++ b/src/node_options.cc
@@ -687,6 +687,12 @@ EnvironmentOptionsParser::EnvironmentOptionsParser() {
             &EnvironmentOptions::allow_fs_write,
             kAllowedInEnvvar,
             OptionNamespaces::kPermissionNamespace);
+  AddOption("--allow-fs-vfs",
+            "allow mounting a virtual file system when any permissions are set",
+            BOOL_FIELD(allow_fs_vfs),
+            kAllowedInEnvvar,
+            false,
+            OptionNamespaces::kPermissionNamespace);
   AddOption("--allow-addons",
             "allow use of addons when any permissions are set",
             BOOL_FIELD(allow_addons),
diff --git a/src/node_options.h b/src/node_options.h
index 907174fe6c57..dd0c37da3b4b 100644
--- a/src/node_options.h
+++ b/src/node_options.h
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ class EnvironmentOptions : public Options {
   DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(permission) = false;
   DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(permission_audit) = false;
   DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(allow_addons) = false;
+  DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(allow_fs_vfs) = false;
   DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(allow_inspector) = false;
   DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(allow_child_process) = false;
   DEFINE_BOOL_FIELD(allow_net) = false;
diff --git a/src/node_process_methods.cc b/src/node_process_methods.cc
index 8f800be35431..6a35e5c5e4c4 100644
--- a/src/node_process_methods.cc
+++ b/src/node_process_methods.cc
@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static void CreatePerIsolateProperties(IsolateData* isolate_data,
 
   SetMethodNoSideEffect(isolate, target, "cwd", Cwd);
   SetMethod(isolate, target, "dlopen", binding::DLOpen);
+  SetMethod(isolate, target, "dlopenBinary", binding::DLOpenBinary);
   SetMethod(isolate, target, "reallyExit", ReallyExit);
 
 #if defined __POSIX__ && !defined(__PASE__)
@@ -854,6 +855,7 @@ void RegisterExternalReferences(ExternalReferenceRegistry* registry) {
 
   registry->Register(Cwd);
   registry->Register(binding::DLOpen);
+  registry->Register(binding::DLOpenBinary);
   registry->Register(ReallyExit);
 
 #if defined __POSIX__ && !defined(__PASE__)
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-dlopen-binary.js b/test/parallel/test-dlopen-binary.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a575a52c975
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/parallel/test-dlopen-binary.js
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Flags: --expose-internals
+'use strict';
+const common = require('../common');
+const assert = require('assert');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { internalBinding } = require('internal/test/binding');
+
+// dlopenBinary() loads a native addon from bytes already in memory, for an
+// addon that the dynamic loader cannot open by path (e.g. one served by a
+// virtual file system). It is internal: process.dlopen() keeps its documented
+// (module, filename[, flags]) signature and never takes the bytes.
+const { dlopenBinary } = internalBinding('process_methods');
+assert.strictEqual(typeof dlopenBinary, 'function');
+assert.strictEqual(process.dlopen.length, 0);
+
+const addonPath = path.join(
+  __dirname, '..', 'addons', 'hello-world', 'build', 'Release', 'binding.node');
+if (!fs.existsSync(addonPath)) common.skip('the hello-world addon is not built');
+const bytes = fs.readFileSync(addonPath);
+const flags = (os.constants.dlopen?.RTLD_LAZY) || 0;
+
+// A path that does not exist on disk, as a VFS-resident addon would be.
+const fakePath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nonexistent-vfs-dir', 'binding.node');
+assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(fakePath));
+
+const m = { exports: {} };
+dlopenBinary(m, fakePath, flags, bytes);
+assert.strictEqual(typeof m.exports.hello, 'function');
+assert.strictEqual(m.exports.hello(), 'world');
+
+// The flags argument may be left undefined when passing bytes.
+const m2 = { exports: {} };
+dlopenBinary(m2, fakePath, undefined, bytes);
+assert.strictEqual(m2.exports.hello(), 'world');
+
+// Without the bytes, that nonexistent path cannot be loaded.
+assert.throws(() => dlopenBinary({ exports: {} }, fakePath, flags),
+              { code: 'ERR_DLOPEN_FAILED' });
+
+// A non-buffer binary is rejected.
+assert.throws(
+  () => dlopenBinary({ exports: {} }, fakePath, flags, 'nope'),
+  { code: 'ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE' });
+
+// process.dlopen() ignores a fourth argument rather than loading from it: the
+// public signature is unchanged, so this still fails on the missing path.
+assert.throws(
+  () => process.dlopen({ exports: {} }, fakePath, flags, bytes),
+  { code: 'ERR_DLOPEN_FAILED' });
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-permission-dlopen-binary.js b/test/parallel/test-permission-dlopen-binary.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3bf2321564fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/parallel/test-permission-dlopen-binary.js
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+// Flags: --expose-internals
+'use strict';
+
+// Loading an addon from bytes materializes them into an image in the temporary
+// directory, so dlopenBinary() requires file-system write access on top of the
+// addon permission every dlopen already needs. Granting only one of the two is
+// not enough.
+
+const common = require('../common');
+const assert = require('assert');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const addonPath = path.join(
+  __dirname, '..', 'addons', 'hello-world', 'build', 'Release', 'binding.node');
+if (!fs.existsSync(addonPath)) common.skip('the hello-world addon is not built');
+
+// Loads the addon from bytes at a path that does not exist on disk, as an
+// addon served by a virtual file system would be, and reports what happened.
+const child = `
+  const { internalBinding } = require('internal/test/binding');
+  const fs = require('fs');
+  const os = require('os');
+  const path = require('path');
+  const { dlopenBinary } = internalBinding('process_methods');
+  const bytes = fs.readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(addonPath)});
+  const target = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nonexistent-vfs-dir', 'binding.node');
+  const m = { exports: {} };
+  try {
+    dlopenBinary(m, target, undefined, bytes);
+    console.log('LOADED', m.exports.hello());
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.log('DENIED', err.code, err.permission ?? '');
+  }
+`;
+
+function run(...permissions) {
+  return spawnSync(
+    process.execPath,
+    ['--expose-internals', '--permission', '--allow-fs-read=*',
+     ...permissions, '-e', child],
+    { encoding: 'utf8' });
+}
+
+// Both permissions granted: the addon loads.
+{
+  const res = run('--allow-addons', '--allow-fs-write=*');
+  assert.strictEqual(res.status, 0, res.stderr);
+  assert.match(res.stdout, /LOADED world/);
+}
+
+// Addons allowed but no write access: refused by the file-system check, so the
+// bytes are never materialized.
+{
+  const res = run('--allow-addons');
+  assert.strictEqual(res.status, 0, res.stderr);
+  assert.match(res.stdout, /DENIED ERR_ACCESS_DENIED FileSystemWrite/);
+}
+
+// Write access but addons disallowed: refused before the bytes are looked at,
+// the same as any other dlopen under the permission model.
+{
+  const res = run('--allow-fs-write=*');
+  assert.strictEqual(res.status, 0, res.stderr);
+  assert.match(res.stdout, /DENIED ERR_DLOPEN_DISABLED/);
+}
+
+// Without the permission model neither check applies.
+{
+  const res = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['--expose-internals', '-e', child],
+                        { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  assert.strictEqual(res.status, 0, res.stderr);
+  assert.match(res.stdout, /LOADED world/);
+}
+
+// The same, reached the way a program actually gets here: an addon inside a
+// mounted VFS. Mounting one under the permission model needs --allow-fs-vfs.
+{
+  const mounted = `
+    const fs = require('fs');
+    const vfs = require('node:vfs');
+    const myVfs = vfs.create();
+    myVfs.writeFileSync('/binding.node',
+                        fs.readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(addonPath)}));
+    const mountPoint = myVfs.mount();
+    try {
+      console.log('LOADED', require(mountPoint + '/binding.node').hello());
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.log('DENIED', err.code, err.permission ?? '');
+    }
+  `;
+  const vfsRun = (...permissions) => spawnSync(
+    process.execPath,
+    ['--experimental-vfs', '--permission', '--allow-fs-read=*',
+     ...permissions, '-e', mounted],
+    { encoding: 'utf8' });
+
+  const ok = vfsRun('--allow-fs-vfs', '--allow-addons', '--allow-fs-write=*');
+  assert.strictEqual(ok.status, 0, ok.stderr);
+  assert.match(ok.stdout, /LOADED world/);
+
+  // Mounting itself is refused without --allow-fs-vfs.
+  const noVfs = vfsRun('--allow-addons', '--allow-fs-write=*');
+  assert.notStrictEqual(noVfs.status, 0);
+  assert.match(noVfs.stderr, /ERR_INVALID_STATE/);
+  assert.match(noVfs.stderr, /--allow-fs-vfs/);
+
+  // Mounted, addons allowed, but no write access: the addon is refused.
+  const noWrite = vfsRun('--allow-fs-vfs', '--allow-addons');
+  assert.strictEqual(noWrite.status, 0, noWrite.stderr);
+  assert.match(noWrite.stdout, /DENIED ERR_ACCESS_DENIED FileSystemWrite/);
+}
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-vfs-addon.js b/test/parallel/test-vfs-addon.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c138a187d0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/parallel/test-vfs-addon.js
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Flags: --experimental-vfs
+'use strict';
+const common = require('../common');
+const assert = require('assert');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const vfs = require('node:vfs');
+
+const addonPath = path.join(
+  __dirname, '..', 'addons', 'hello-world', 'build', 'Release', 'binding.node');
+if (!fs.existsSync(addonPath)) {
+  common.skip('the hello-world addon is not built');
+}
+
+// A native addon inside a mounted VFS can be require()d: dlopen() cannot open
+// the reserved mount path, so the loader hands the addon's bytes to
+// process.dlopen's `binary` option, which loads them from a private temporary
+// image (an in-memory memfd on Linux).
+const myVfs = vfs.create();
+myVfs.writeFileSync('/binding.node', fs.readFileSync(addonPath));
+const mountPoint = myVfs.mount();
+
+const before = new Set(fs.readdirSync(os.tmpdir()));
+const addon = require(path.join(mountPoint, 'binding.node'));
+assert.strictEqual(addon.hello(), 'world');
+
+// On Linux the memfd path never touches the filesystem; on other POSIX the
+// temp image is unlinked right after loading, so no addon temp file lingers.
+// (Windows keeps a delete-on-close file until exit, so skip the check there.)
+if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
+  const leaked = fs.readdirSync(os.tmpdir())
+    .filter((f) => f.startsWith('node-addon') && !before.has(f));
+  assert.deepStrictEqual(leaked, [], `addon temp not cleaned up: ${leaked}`);
+}
+
+myVfs.unmount();