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chore: remove verified unused dependencies (v2) - #2511

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chore: remove verified unused dependencies (v2)#2511
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oscarld/remove-all-unused-dependencies-v2

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@Eldolfin

@Eldolfin Eldolfin commented Sep 11, 2026 •
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What does this PR do?

Removes unused dependencies across the workspace.

This is a v2 of #2319. I ran cargo machete with metadata, then audited every finding to preserve false positives required by build scripts, targets, features, and workspace resolution.

Motivation

  • Hopefully slightly faster compile times and a simpler dependency tree
  • Cleaner repo overall

Additional Notes

The cargo-machete allow list will be added in a follow-up.

How to test the change?

CI should be able to catch if I broke something.

APMSP-3056

[Generated using codex]

@Eldolfin Eldolfin mentioned this pull request Sep 11, 2026
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🔒 Cargo Deny Results

⚠️ 21 issue(s) found, showing only errors (advisories, bans, sources)

📦 bin_tests - ✅ No issues

📦 build_common - ✅ No issues

📦 datadog-sidecar-ffi - 3 error(s)

Show output 
error[unmaintained]: Bincode is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:35:1
   │
35 │ bincode 1.3.3 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Due to a doxxing and harassment incident, the bincode team has taken the decision to cease development permanently.
     
     The team considers version 1.3.3 a complete version of bincode that is not in need of any updates.
     
     ## Alternatives to consider
     
     * [wincode](https://crates.io/crates/wincode)
     * [postcard](https://crates.io/crates/postcard)
     * [bitcode](https://crates.io/crates/bitcode)
     * [rkyv](https://crates.io/crates/rkyv)
   ├ Announcement: https://git.sr.ht/~stygianentity/bincode/tree/v3.0/item/README.md
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bincode v1.3.3
     ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
     │   └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1
     ├── (dev) libdd-ffe v2.0.0
     │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
     └── libdd-ipc v2.0.0
         ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
         └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)

error[unsound]: Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `LruCache::pop()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:232:1
    │
232 │ lru 0.16.4 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0253
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0253
    ├ `LruCache::pop()` in `lru` was not panic-safe. If the `Drop` implementation of a stored key panics during `pop()`, `self.detach()` is never called, leaving dangling pointers in the internal doubly-linked list.
      
      A subsequent cache operation that triggers eviction can then dereference these dangling pointers:
      - The node is freed from the map, but remains linked in the LRU list due to the skipped `detach()` call
      - When a new insertion causes eviction, the LRU traversal encounters the dangling pointer
      - This results in a write to already-freed memory during the eviction process
      
      ## Impact
      
      - **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** memory corruption when subsequent cache operations access freed node pointers in the linked list
      - **CWE-415 (Double Free):** potential heap corruption when the same memory is freed multiple times
      
      Both types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if unwinding panics are enabled and `std::panic::catch_unwind` is used with key types that have potentially-panicking `Drop` implementations.
      
      ## Fix
      
      Fixed in `lru` 0.18.2 by detaching the node from the linked list before freeing it and dropping the key ([lru-rs#238](https://github.com/jeromefroe/lru-rs/pull/238)).
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/jeromefroe/lru-rs/pull/238
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.18.2 (try `cargo update -p lru`)
    ├ lru v0.16.4
      └── libdd-ffe v2.0.0
          └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
              └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1

error[unmaintained]: paste - no longer maintained
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:273:1
    │
273 │ paste 1.0.15 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2024-0436
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0436
    ├ The creator of the crate `paste` has stated in the [`README.md`](https://github.com/dtolnay/paste/blob/master/README.md) 
      that this project is not longer maintained as well as archived the repository
      
      ## Possible Alternative(s)
      
      - [`pastey`]: a fork of paste and is aimed to be a drop-in replacement with additional features for paste crate
      - [`with_builtin_macros`]: crate providing a [superset of `paste`'s functionality including general `macro_rules!` eager expansions](https://docs.rs/with_builtin_macros/0.1.0/with_builtin_macros/macro.with_eager_expansions.html)  and `concat!`/`concat_idents!` macros
      
      [`pastey`]: https://crates.io/crates/pastey
      [`with_builtin_macros`]: https://crates.io/crates/with_builtin_macros
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/dtolnay/paste
    ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
    ├ paste v1.0.15
      ├── libdd-libunwind-sys v1.0.3
      │   └── libdd-crashtracker v3.0.0
      │       ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
      │       │   └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1
      │       ├── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
      │       └── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v44.0.0
      │           ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │           └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
      ├── libdd-telemetry-ffi v44.0.0
      │   └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
      └── rmp v0.8.14
          ├── libdd-trace-utils v12.0.0
          │   ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
          │   ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
          │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v10.0.0
          │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
          │   │   └── libdd-live-debugger v1.0.0
          │   │       ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
          │   │       └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
          │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline-core v1.0.0
          │   │   └── libdd-data-pipeline v10.0.0 (*)
          │   ├── libdd-trace-obfuscation v8.0.0
          │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v10.0.0 (*)
          │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline-core v1.0.0 (*)
          │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v9.0.0
          │   │       ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
          │   │       ├── libdd-data-pipeline v10.0.0 (*)
          │   │       └── libdd-ipc v2.0.0
          │   │           ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
          │   │           └── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
          │   ├── libdd-trace-stats v9.0.0 (*)
          │   └── (dev) libdd-trace-utils v12.0.0 (*)
          ├── rmp-serde v1.3.0
          │   ├── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
          │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v10.0.0 (*)
          │   ├── (dev) libdd-tinybytes v1.1.3
          │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
          │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar-ffi v0.0.1 (*)
          │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v10.0.0 (*)
          │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-data-pipeline-core v1.0.0 (*)
          │   │   ├── libdd-ipc v2.0.0 (*)
          │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-tinybytes v1.1.3 (*)
          │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-trace-obfuscation v8.0.0 (*)
          │   │   └── libdd-trace-utils v12.0.0 (*)
          │   ├── libdd-trace-stats v9.0.0 (*)
          │   └── libdd-trace-utils v12.0.0 (*)
          └── rmpv v1.3.0
              └── libdd-trace-utils v12.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 datadog-sidecar - 2 error(s)

Show output 
error[unmaintained]: Bincode is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:35:1
   │
35 │ bincode 1.3.3 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Due to a doxxing and harassment incident, the bincode team has taken the decision to cease development permanently.
     
     The team considers version 1.3.3 a complete version of bincode that is not in need of any updates.
     
     ## Alternatives to consider
     
     * [wincode](https://crates.io/crates/wincode)
     * [postcard](https://crates.io/crates/postcard)
     * [bitcode](https://crates.io/crates/bitcode)
     * [rkyv](https://crates.io/crates/rkyv)
   ├ Announcement: https://git.sr.ht/~stygianentity/bincode/tree/v3.0/item/README.md
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bincode v1.3.3
     ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
     ├── (dev) libdd-ffe v2.0.0
     │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
     └── libdd-ipc v2.0.0
         └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)

error[unsound]: Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `LruCache::pop()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:230:1
    │
230 │ lru 0.16.4 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0253
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0253
    ├ `LruCache::pop()` in `lru` was not panic-safe. If the `Drop` implementation of a stored key panics during `pop()`, `self.detach()` is never called, leaving dangling pointers in the internal doubly-linked list.
      
      A subsequent cache operation that triggers eviction can then dereference these dangling pointers:
      - The node is freed from the map, but remains linked in the LRU list due to the skipped `detach()` call
      - When a new insertion causes eviction, the LRU traversal encounters the dangling pointer
      - This results in a write to already-freed memory during the eviction process
      
      ## Impact
      
      - **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** memory corruption when subsequent cache operations access freed node pointers in the linked list
      - **CWE-415 (Double Free):** potential heap corruption when the same memory is freed multiple times
      
      Both types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if unwinding panics are enabled and `std::panic::catch_unwind` is used with key types that have potentially-panicking `Drop` implementations.
      
      ## Fix
      
      Fixed in `lru` 0.18.2 by detaching the node from the linked list before freeing it and dropping the key ([lru-rs#238](https://github.com/jeromefroe/lru-rs/pull/238)).
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/jeromefroe/lru-rs/pull/238
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.18.2 (try `cargo update -p lru`)
    ├ lru v0.16.4
      └── libdd-ffe v2.0.0
          └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-agent-client - 2 error(s)

Show output 
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:84:1
   │
84 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             └── libdd-http-client v2.0.0
                 └── libdd-agent-client v44.0.0

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:84:1
   │
84 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             └── libdd-http-client v2.0.0
                 └── libdd-agent-client v44.0.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-common - 2 error(s)

Show output 
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:66:1
   │
66 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             └── libdd-common v6.0.0

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:66:1
   │
66 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             └── libdd-common v6.0.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-crashtracker-ffi - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-data-pipeline - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-ffe - 2 error(s)

Show output 
error[unmaintained]: Bincode is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:21:1
   │
21 │ bincode 1.3.3 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Due to a doxxing and harassment incident, the bincode team has taken the decision to cease development permanently.
     
     The team considers version 1.3.3 a complete version of bincode that is not in need of any updates.
     
     ## Alternatives to consider
     
     * [wincode](https://crates.io/crates/wincode)
     * [postcard](https://crates.io/crates/postcard)
     * [bitcode](https://crates.io/crates/bitcode)
     * [rkyv](https://crates.io/crates/rkyv)
   ├ Announcement: https://git.sr.ht/~stygianentity/bincode/tree/v3.0/item/README.md
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bincode v1.3.3
     └── (dev) libdd-ffe v2.0.0

error[unsound]: Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `LruCache::pop()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:127:1
    │
127 │ lru 0.16.4 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0253
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0253
    ├ `LruCache::pop()` in `lru` was not panic-safe. If the `Drop` implementation of a stored key panics during `pop()`, `self.detach()` is never called, leaving dangling pointers in the internal doubly-linked list.
      
      A subsequent cache operation that triggers eviction can then dereference these dangling pointers:
      - The node is freed from the map, but remains linked in the LRU list due to the skipped `detach()` call
      - When a new insertion causes eviction, the LRU traversal encounters the dangling pointer
      - This results in a write to already-freed memory during the eviction process
      
      ## Impact
      
      - **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** memory corruption when subsequent cache operations access freed node pointers in the linked list
      - **CWE-415 (Double Free):** potential heap corruption when the same memory is freed multiple times
      
      Both types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if unwinding panics are enabled and `std::panic::catch_unwind` is used with key types that have potentially-panicking `Drop` implementations.
      
      ## Fix
      
      Fixed in `lru` 0.18.2 by detaching the node from the linked list before freeing it and dropping the key ([lru-rs#238](https://github.com/jeromefroe/lru-rs/pull/238)).
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/jeromefroe/lru-rs/pull/238
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.18.2 (try `cargo update -p lru`)
    ├ lru v0.16.4
      └── libdd-ffe v2.0.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-ipc - 1 error(s)

Show output 
error[unmaintained]: Bincode is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:24:1
   │
24 │ bincode 1.3.3 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Due to a doxxing and harassment incident, the bincode team has taken the decision to cease development permanently.
     
     The team considers version 1.3.3 a complete version of bincode that is not in need of any updates.
     
     ## Alternatives to consider
     
     * [wincode](https://crates.io/crates/wincode)
     * [postcard](https://crates.io/crates/postcard)
     * [bitcode](https://crates.io/crates/bitcode)
     * [rkyv](https://crates.io/crates/rkyv)
   ├ Announcement: https://git.sr.ht/~stygianentity/bincode/tree/v3.0/item/README.md
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bincode v1.3.3
     └── libdd-ipc v2.0.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-library-config-ffi - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-library-config - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-live-debugger-ffi - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 4 error(s)

Show output 
error[unsound]: `Bitmap::try_from(&[u8])` can create invalid values
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:20:1
   │
20 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ The `TryFrom<&[u8]>` implementation for `Bitmap<SIZE>` copies the input bytes
     into an uninitialized backing store and calls `assume_init()` without
     validating that the bytes form a valid value of the backing store type. For
     `SIZE = 1` the backing store is a `bool`, so any input byte other than `0x00`
     or `0x01` produces an invalid value, which is immediate undefined behavior.
     
     The `AsMut<[u8]>` implementation has the same problem, as it allows safe code
     to write invalid bit patterns into the backing store through the returned slice.
     
     No fixed version is available, as the crate is unmaintained; its GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps/issues/35
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
         └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0

error[unmaintained]: bitmaps is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:20:1
   │
20 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ The bitmaps crate is unmaintained; all versions are affected. The GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
     
     Recommended alternatives:
     
     * [fixedbitset](https://crates.io/crates/fixedbitset)
     * [bitvec](https://crates.io/crates/bitvec)
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
         └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:91:1
   │
91 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v6.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v44.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:91:1
   │
91 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v6.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v44.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-profiling - 4 error(s)

Show output 
error[unsound]: `Bitmap::try_from(&[u8])` can create invalid values
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:15:1
   │
15 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ The `TryFrom<&[u8]>` implementation for `Bitmap<SIZE>` copies the input bytes
     into an uninitialized backing store and calls `assume_init()` without
     validating that the bytes form a valid value of the backing store type. For
     `SIZE = 1` the backing store is a `bool`, so any input byte other than `0x00`
     or `0x01` produces an invalid value, which is immediate undefined behavior.
     
     The `AsMut<[u8]>` implementation has the same problem, as it allows safe code
     to write invalid bit patterns into the backing store through the returned slice.
     
     No fixed version is available, as the crate is unmaintained; its GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps/issues/35
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[unmaintained]: bitmaps is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:15:1
   │
15 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ The bitmaps crate is unmaintained; all versions are affected. The GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
     
     Recommended alternatives:
     
     * [fixedbitset](https://crates.io/crates/fixedbitset)
     * [bitvec](https://crates.io/crates/bitvec)
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:80:1
   │
80 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v6.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │       └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:80:1
   │
80 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v6.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │       └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-remote-config - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-telemetry-ffi - 1 error(s)

Show output 
error[unmaintained]: paste - no longer maintained
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:174:1
    │
174 │ paste 1.0.15 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2024-0436
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0436
    ├ The creator of the crate `paste` has stated in the [`README.md`](https://github.com/dtolnay/paste/blob/master/README.md) 
      that this project is not longer maintained as well as archived the repository
      
      ## Possible Alternative(s)
      
      - [`pastey`]: a fork of paste and is aimed to be a drop-in replacement with additional features for paste crate
      - [`with_builtin_macros`]: crate providing a [superset of `paste`'s functionality including general `macro_rules!` eager expansions](https://docs.rs/with_builtin_macros/0.1.0/with_builtin_macros/macro.with_eager_expansions.html)  and `concat!`/`concat_idents!` macros
      
      [`pastey`]: https://crates.io/crates/pastey
      [`with_builtin_macros`]: https://crates.io/crates/with_builtin_macros
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/dtolnay/paste
    ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
    ├ paste v1.0.15
      └── libdd-telemetry-ffi v44.0.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-trace-stats - ✅ No issues

📦 test_spawn_from_lib - ✅ No issues

Updated: 2026-09-11 12:27:14 UTC | Commit: a906fd0 | dependency-check job results

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Sep 11, 2026

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📚 Documentation Check Results

⚠️ 18330 documentation warning(s) found

📦 bin_tests - 1224 warning(s)

📦 build_common - 3 warning(s)

📦 datadog-sidecar-ffi - 3227 warning(s)

📦 datadog-sidecar - 2938 warning(s)

📦 libdd-agent-client - 124 warning(s)

📦 libdd-common - 169 warning(s)

📦 libdd-crashtracker-ffi - 1284 warning(s)

📦 libdd-data-pipeline - 1304 warning(s)

📦 libdd-ffe - 387 warning(s)

📦 libdd-ipc - 1029 warning(s)

📦 libdd-library-config-ffi - 578 warning(s)

📦 libdd-library-config - 265 warning(s)

📦 libdd-live-debugger-ffi - 1961 warning(s)

📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 770 warning(s)

📦 libdd-profiling - 649 warning(s)

📦 libdd-remote-config - 682 warning(s)

📦 libdd-telemetry-ffi - 734 warning(s)

📦 libdd-trace-stats - 924 warning(s)

📦 test_spawn_from_lib - 78 warning(s)

Updated: 2026-09-11 12:28:19 UTC | Commit: a906fd0 | missing-docs job results

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datadog-official Bot commented Sep 11, 2026

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