Mint per-segment grants for multi-step shell chains (CL-5752)

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -24,6 +24,22 @@ parallel copies under `docs/` or `scripts/notes/`. At cut time: rename
 - One-shot confirmation flashes (copy, mouse toggle, attach results, reasoning effort, stall recovery) now clear themselves after a short TTL. Rate-limit waits no longer park on the bottom notice row; the durable error stays in the transcript. Live stall notice and landing hold still omit a TTL so they stay until replaced.
 - A TTL flash no longer paints chrome after the TUI renderer is destroyed, which crashed parallel TUI tests with `TextBuffer is destroyed`.
 
+### Security
+
+- **Shell chain approvals no longer skip minting once a chain gets long.**
+  Chains of 5+ segments used to be accept-once only — no grant was ever
+  persisted, so the same long chain re-prompted every single time no matter
+  what had already been approved. Approving a multi-segment chain now mints
+  one grant per real segment instead of one grant for the whole string, so
+  approving `a && b` also covers `b` on its own later, and long chains behave
+  the same as short ones. This is a real change in what a single approval
+  buys: granting per segment is strictly more permissive on later commands
+  than granting one exact whole-string match was, since a segment now reuses
+  outside the chain it was first approved in. Nothing that previously
+  auto-approved now prompts, and nothing that previously required a fresh
+  decision now silently skips one — chains still ask for any segment that
+  isn't already granted.
+
 ## [0.3.1] - 2026-08-24
 
 ### Fixed

scripts/approval-forensics.ts

@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@
 // before approval volume could be measured at all.
 //
 // Reports: total asks, split by mode (auto vs interactive) and outcome, a
-// per-rule breakdown, settle-duration and display-delay percentiles (the
+// per-rule breakdown, and settle-duration and display-delay percentiles (the
 // display delay is the CL-5664 signal — a queued gate arming its timeout
-// before the operator could see it), and a mega-chain count (segments >=
-// MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD).
+// before the operator could see it).
 //
 // Prints only aggregate counts and timings, never a tool subject or command
 // text — the log itself never records either, so there is nothing to leak
@@ -19,7 +18,6 @@ import { join } from "node:path";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 
 import { APPROVAL_LOG_FILE, type ApprovalRecord } from "../src/permission/approval-log.js";
-import { MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD } from "../src/permission/classify.js";
 
 // lstat, and skip symlinks: session dirs carry a `latest` symlink to a real
 // session, and following it double-counts every record in that session.
@@ -56,7 +54,6 @@ interface Bucket {
   byMode: Map<string, number>;
   durations: number[];
   displayDelays: number[];
-  megaChains: number;
 }
 
 function emptyBucket(): Bucket {
@@ -66,7 +63,6 @@ function emptyBucket(): Bucket {
     byMode: new Map(),
     durations: [],
     displayDelays: [],
-    megaChains: 0,
   };
 }
 
@@ -111,7 +107,6 @@ for (const file of files) {
     bucket.byMode.set(record.mode, (bucket.byMode.get(record.mode) ?? 0) + 1);
     if (typeof record.durationMs === "number") bucket.durations.push(record.durationMs);
     if (typeof record.displayDelayMs === "number") bucket.displayDelays.push(record.displayDelayMs);
-    if ((record.segments ?? 0) >= MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD) bucket.megaChains++;
 
     // Duplicate-rate proxy: how often the same rule fires more than once per
     // session file (a session repeatedly asking for something it was already
@@ -133,7 +128,7 @@ if (records === 0) {
 
 const rows = [...buckets.entries()].sort((a, b) => b[1].count - a[1].count);
 console.log(
-  "\ntool                        n  auto/interactive  duration p50/p90/max  displayDelay p50/p90/max  megaChains",
+  "\ntool                        n  auto/interactive  duration p50/p90/max  displayDelay p50/p90/max",
 );
 for (const [key, bucket] of rows) {
   const durations = [...bucket.durations].sort((a, b) => a - b);
@@ -149,7 +144,7 @@ for (const [key, bucket] of rows) {
   const autoCount = bucket.byMode.get("auto") ?? 0;
   const interactiveCount = bucket.byMode.get("interactive") ?? 0;
   console.log(
-    `${key.padEnd(26)} ${String(bucket.count).padStart(3)}  ${String(autoCount).padStart(4)}/${String(interactiveCount).padEnd(11)} ${durDist.padEnd(24)} ${delayDist.padEnd(24)} ${bucket.megaChains}`,
+    `${key.padEnd(26)} ${String(bucket.count).padStart(3)}  ${String(autoCount).padStart(4)}/${String(interactiveCount).padEnd(11)} ${durDist.padEnd(24)} ${delayDist}`,
   );
 }
 

src/permission/authz-grants.ts

@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ export function cwdMatchesGrant(
 // The single place that decides whether a grant's tool/providerModel/cwd
 // scope covers a request, independent of whether the grant's pattern matches
 // the request's subject. Every live call site that needs to know "does this
-// grant cover this request's scope" — evaluateApprovals, isRequestCoveredByGrant,
-// hasExactFullCommandGrant — delegates here so a scoping-dimension change
-// never has to be made in more than one place.
+// grant cover this request's scope" — evaluateApprovals, isRequestCoveredByGrant —
+// delegates here so a scoping-dimension change never has to be made in more
+// than one place.
 export function grantScopeMatches(
   approval: Approval,
   tool: string,

src/permission/classify.ts

@@ -440,17 +440,6 @@ function stringArg(call: ToolCall, key: string): string {
   return typeof value === "string" ? value : "";
 }
 
-// A shell chain at or above this many top-level segments gets accept-once-only
-// approval: no scope is offered or minted, however broad or exact. A grant
-// this coarse would let one operator decision silently cover an unbounded,
-// ever-changing family of commands as the model keeps appending segments;
-// forcing a fresh decision every time keeps mega-chains reviewable instead of
-// rubber-stamped once and replayed forever. Below the threshold, the existing
-// exact-only multi-segment rule (and single-segment ladder) is unchanged.
-export const MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD = 5;
-
-export const MEGA_CHAIN_NOTICE = `Chains of ${MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD}+ steps are approved once only — split into shorter commands for reusable approvals.`;
-
 // The real (non-comment-only) chain segments of a shell command — the basis
 // both shellApprovalScopes and isSingleShellCommand use to answer "is this
 // one command or a chain."
@@ -469,19 +458,26 @@ export function isSingleShellCommand(command: string): boolean {
 }
 
 // Approval scopes for a shell command the operator may persist. Multi-segment
-// chains only offer the exact full string — a prefix like `npm *` would also
-// match `npm i && rm -rf /` on a later call (fail-closed). At or above
-// MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD, no scope is offered at all — see the constant.
+// chains only offer the full chain string as the persist payload — a prefix
+// like `npm *` would also match `npm i && rm -rf /` on a later call
+// (fail-closed). Minting decomposes that payload into one grant per real
+// segment (see mintGrant in gate.ts), so the label names the actual effect:
+// each step becomes its own reusable approval.
 function shellApprovalScopes(command: string): ApprovalScope[] {
   const segments = realShellSegments(command);
   if (segments.length === 0) return [];
-  if (segments.length >= MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD) return [];
   if (segments.length === 1) {
     const only = segments[0];
     if (only === undefined) return [];
     return deriveCommandScopes(only);
   }
-  return [{ id: "exact", label: "Always allow this exact command", pattern: command.trim() }];
+  return [
+    {
+      id: "exact",
+      label: "Always allow each command in this chain",
+      pattern: command.trim(),
+    },
+  ];
 }
 
 // Decompose an "ask"-tier tool call into the approval request(s) the operator
@@ -502,9 +498,6 @@ export function buildRequests(call: ToolCall): PermissionRequest[] {
         subject: command,
         arguments: { command },
         scopes: shellApprovalScopes(command),
-        ...(realSegments.length >= MEGA_CHAIN_SEGMENT_THRESHOLD
-          ? { notice: MEGA_CHAIN_NOTICE }
-          : {}),
       },
     ];
   }