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Security: idea-torx/mindOS

Security

SECURITY.md

Security & Privacy Boundary

What MindOS will never do (v1 contract)

MindOS is a registry and evidence layer. It does not:

  • deploy, merge, or push code
  • send external messages or call external APIs for writes
  • submit applications or take side effects on any external system
  • run arbitrary agent commands
  • access Keychain values or credential stores

Data boundary

All state lives in a local SQLite home ($MINDOS_HOME, default ~/.hermes/autopilot). The repository itself must never contain:

Never commit Why
state.db, temporal.db live execution truth / temporal facts
receipts/, installation-reports/ sealed evidence and inventory manifests
sessions/, semantic-memory exports session caches and semantic memory
backups/, runtime/ machine-local recovery artifacts
.env, key files credentials
Claude memory contents (memory/, sync JSON) personal agent memory

Built-in secret guard

Every user-supplied text field passes _secret_findings() in autopilot.py before persistence. It detects GitHub/Slack/Google-style tokens and generic credential-shaped assignments. Findings either block the write (audited as secret_blocked), redact it (secret_redacted), or pass verbatim only under an explicit, itself-audited --allow-secret override (secret_allowed) so fleet sweeps can still locate the value. Migration imports run the same guard over free-form provenance fields.

Reporting

Report suspected vulnerabilities privately to the maintainer rather than opening a public issue. Include reproduction steps and affected commands.

There aren't any published security advisories