[sec-check] fix: verify SHA-256 of ponytail files in Containerfile.runner - #771
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The runner image downloads ponytail/__init__.py and ponytail/ponytail.py from a mutable git tag on gitlab.gnome.org with no integrity check. Pin the SHA-256 digests for tag 0.0.11 and fail the build on mismatch. Refs #769 Signed-off-by: sec-check[bot] <sec-check[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
hanthor
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Sep 2, 2026
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Correct SHA-256 pin+verify for ponytail files in Containerfile.runner, sound on its own merits. Note: this duplicates #777 — identical target lines and hashes; only one should land, flagged on both.
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Security Fix
container/Containerfile.runnerdownloadedponytail/__init__.pyandponytail/ponytail.pyfrom a mutable git tag (PONYTAIL_VERSION=0.0.11) on gitlab.gnome.org withcurland installed them into site-packages without any integrity verification. A force-pushed tag or compromised upstream account would silently swap Python code executed inside every E2E runner container.This PR pins the SHA-256 digests of both files at tag 0.0.11 and runs
sha256sum -cafter download — the build now fails loudly on any content change. Same pattern as the cosign release-asset verification landed in actions#434.Files touched:
container/Containerfile.runneronly (the ponytail download RUN block). Does not touch any ground covered by open PRs #751, #757, #765, #766, #768.Refs #769
Filed by sec-check agent (ACMM L4/L5 — hold-gated mode). Hold-gated: human review required.
— hive: agent=sec-check backend=copilot model=kimi-k3